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a b s t r a c t
The paper1 develops a technique for computation inference rules admissible in temporal
logic TS4. The problem whether there exists an algorithm recognizing inference rules
admissible in TS4 is a long-standing open problem. The logic TS4 has neither the extension
property nor the co-cover property which previously were central instruments for
construction decision algorithms for admissibility in modal logics (e.g. reflexive and
transitive modal logic S4). Our paper uses a linear-compression property, a zigzag-ray
property and a zigzag stretching property which hold for TS4. The main result of the paper
is a sufficient condition for admissibility inference rules in TS4. It is shown that all rules
which are valid in special finite models (with an effective upper bound on size) must be
admissible in TS4.
© 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Temporal logic has nowadays various applications in Computer Science and Artificial Intelligence. The beginning
of applications to computer science is most frequently referred to [29], who employed tools of temporal logic to the
specification and verification of programs (especially to concurrent programs in which the computation is performed by
two or more processors working in parallel). Applications in artificial intelligence were initially concerned with finding
a general framework adequate for the temporal representations required by AI programs. In modern mathematical
symbolic style, temporal logic was introduced by Prior as a result of an interest in the relationship between tense and
modality attributed to the Megarian philosopher Diodorus Cronus (ca. 340–280 B.C.). Applications of temporal logic (as
a branch in mathematical logic) were initially focused on reasoning about knowledge, time and general properties of
computation (cf. [15,48]). This approach has been noticeably influenced by well developed at the time tools of modal
logics (cf. [16]). Since 1970s various forms of temporal logics more directly focused on applications have been introduced
(cf. [26,29,2]). Linear temporal logic (LTL) has been quite successful in applications to systems specifications and verification
(cf. [29]), tomodel checking (cf. [3,27,29]). Use of automatons, e.g. Büchi automaton (cf. [6,49,7,50]) formodel checking in LTL
and their variations, formed a robust branch in logic in computer science. Decidability problem and satisfiability problem
for LTL and other temporal logics were studied from various viewpoints (cf. [1,47,22–24]). It is possible that the initial
interest to temporal logic with linear time came from early papers of Bull on fmp and decidability of linear modal logics
[4,5]. Since then, many interesting results concerning decidability and axiomatizability in temporal logics were obtained
(cf. for instance, [9,11,10]).
Being a useful tool in computer science, temporal logics, in turn, originate computational issues concerning their own
properties. Decidability and satisfiability questions, as mentioned above, were among the first problems on which the
attention has been focused. These problems were profoundly investigated by usual tools of temporal logic (bounded finite
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model property, filtrations, etc.) and tools of computational logic (e.g. automatons, cf. references above). Another problem
related to decidability, which generalizes the decidability problem, is the admissibility problem. The admissibility problem
for a given logicL is, for arbitrary given inference rule r , to compute (answer) whether r is admissible inL. Admissible rules
were (perhaps, first time explicitly) taken into account by Lorenzen [25].
Initially there were only observations concerning existence of interesting examples of admissible but not derivable rules
(cf. [17,28]). Then, [8] posed the problem whether the intuitionistic logic IPC is decidable w.r.t. admissible inference rules.
This problem (together with its counterpart for modal logic S4) was solved affirmatively in [31,35]. Algorithms deciding
admissibility for some transitive modal logics and IPC, which are based on projective formulas and unification, were discov-
ered by Ghilardi [12–14]. Roziere [30] found a solution of the Friedman problem for IPC bymethods of proof theory. Jerábek
[21] investigated complexity of algorithms recognizing admissibility in IPC and related modal logics.
If a logic L itself is decidable and has a decidable basis for admissible rules, then deciding algorithms for admissibility
based on parallel enumeration admissible and non-admissible follow (though, in general, we do not have then an effective
bound). Therefore, the study of bases for admissible rules has been undertaken. Rybakov [32] showed that IPC and S4 do not
have finite bases. Later (cf. [18,20,38]) some explicit infinite and decidable bases were constructed for some modal logics
(e.g. S4, K4,Grz) and IPC. Iemhoff and Metcalfe [19] suggested a proof theory for admissible rules.
Recently, Wolter and Zakharyaschev [51] proved that modal logics situated between Ku and K4u and possessing an
additional universal modality u are undecidable w.r.t admissibility and even w.r.t. just unification. They set in [51] an open
question: If the logic S4u—modal logic S4 with the universal modality u—is decidable w.r.t. admissibility? This question
was answered affirmatively in [43]. In Rybakov [36,37] a refined technique for deciding admissibility, based on dropping,
rarefication and the co-cover property (the extension property), has been developed. This technique allows a general and
uniformway to construct algorithms recognizing admissibility for some important infinite classes of transitivemodal logics.
It covers all previously proved cases of decidability by admissibility (for transitivemodal logics) and solves also the problems
of unification, unification with parameters, problem of solution for logical equations in all these logics.
But it turns out that this technique does not work satisfactorily for intransitive and temporal logics. Therefore, the
research shifted to the phase of study such particular logics. Decidability of the admissibility problem was proved for
(i) the temporal logics of all integer numbersL(Z) and all natural numbersL(N ) (cf. [39]), (ii) for the intransitive temporal
logic of all integer intervals [40], (iii) for variations of LTL with UNTIL and SINCE on integers [41,42], (iv) for temporal logic-
related LTL generated by nearly linear models—models with single branching node [44].
Recently, it was shown that the linear temporal logic LTLwithUNTIL andNEXT operations (famous one from computation
background) is also decidable by admissibility [46] and that all decidable temporal logics admitting universal formula are
also decidable by admissibility [45].
But all these techniques do not allow us to approach standard temporal logics based on arbitrary (not linear) flows of
time, such as TS4. The reason is that such logics do not possess neither the extension property [12,13] nor the co-cover
property [31,33–36] which earlier were central instruments for building algorithms deciding admissibility. Therefore, we
dedicate our paper to construction of a technique which would allow us to compute, to describe, inference rules admissible
in temporal logics related to TS4 (and in TS4 itself). The main result is that we find a sufficient condition for rules to be
admissible in such logics. It is shown that all rules which are valid in special finite models (with an effective upper bound
on size) must be admissible in TS4.
2. Preliminaries, definitions, notation
The paper uses standard notation and technique of relational Kripke/Hintikka semantics for temporal logics. To briefly
recall basic notation and facts, the language of temporal logics consists of the language of Boolean logic extended by two
new unary temporal operations: + (always will be in future) and − (always was in past). The operation ♦+ (will be in the
future) is defined as abbreviation for¬+¬, and ♦− (was in the past) is defined for¬−¬. Formation rules for formulas are
as usual. For a formula ϕ, ♦+ϕ represents the condition: there is a future state where ϕ is true; ♦−ϕ means there was a state
in past where ϕ was true. A Kripke/Hintikka frame is a pair F := ⟨F , R⟩,where F is the base of F —a non-empty set, and R is
a binary (accessibility by time) relation on F . |F | := F , a ∈ F is a denotation for a ∈ |F |. In this paper, we consider only
reflexive and transitive temporal logics, so the accessibility relations R, in the sequel, are always reflexive and transitive. In
what follows, R−1 is the relation converse to R. If, for a set of propositional letters P , a valuation V of P in |F | is defined, i.e.
V : P → 2F , in other words, ∀p ∈ P(V (p) ⊆ F), then the tupleM := ⟨F , V ⟩ is called a Kripke/Hintikka model (structure).
The truth values of formulas are defined at elements of F by the following rules:
∀p ∈ Prop, ∀a ∈ F , (F , a) Vp⇔ a ∈ V (p);
(F , a) Vϕ ∧ ψ⇔(F , a) Vϕ and (F , a) Vψ;
(F , a) Vϕ ∨ ψ⇔(F , a) Vϕ or (F , a) Vψ;
(F , a) ϕ → ψ⇔¬[(F , a) Vϕ] or (F , a) Vψ;
(F , a) V¬ϕ⇔¬[(F , a) Vϕ];
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(F , a) V♦+ϕ⇔∃b ∈ F ((aRb) ∧ (F , b) Vϕ);
(F , a) V♦−ϕ⇔∃b ∈ F ((bRa) ∧ (F , b) Vϕ).
For any a ∈ F , ValV (a) := {pi | pi ∈ P, (F , a) Vpi}. For any formula ϕ, V (ϕ) := {a | a ∈ F , (F , a) Vϕ}.
Definition 1. For a Kripke–Hintikka structure M := ⟨F , V ⟩ and a formula ϕ, ϕ is true in M (denotation – M ϕ) if
∀a ∈ F (F , a) Vϕ. A formula ϕ is true in a frame F (denotation: F ϕ) if ∀V∀w ∈ F ((F , w) Vϕ).
Definition 2. For a classK of frames, the logicL(K) generated byK is the set of all formulas which are true in all models
based on frames fromK .
The temporal logic TS4 is the logicL(Kr+tr), whereKr+tr is the class of all reflexive and transitive frames.
Definition 3. A logicL has the finite model property (fmp in the sequel) ifL = L(K), whereK is a class of finite frames.
As well known, TS4 = L(Kr+tr,f ), where Kr+tr,f is the class of all finite frames from Kr+tr , so, TS4 has fmp. For any logic
L(K), a formula ϕ is a theorem ofL(K) if ϕ ∈ L(K), ϕ is satisfiable inK if, for some valuation V in a frame F ∈ K , ϕ is
true w.r.t. V at an world from F . For reference, a Hilbert style axiomatic system of TS4 is as follows: axioms are all classical
propositional tautologies and (where ϕ and ψ are arbitrary formulas)
(i) +(ϕ → ψ)→ (+ϕ → +ψ), −(ϕ → ψ)→ (−ϕ → −ψ),
(ii) ϕ → +♦−ϕ, ϕ → −♦+ϕ,
(iii) +ϕ → ϕ, −ϕ → ϕ,
(iv) +ϕ → ++ϕ, −ϕ → −−ϕ;
inference rules are









A rule (inference rule) (or, synonymously, – a consecution) r is an expression
r := ϕ1(x1, . . . , xn), . . . , ϕm(x1, . . . , xn)
ψ(x1, . . . , xn)
,
where ϕ1(x1, . . . , xn), . . . , ϕm(x1, . . . , xn) andψ(x1, . . . , xn) are some formulas constructed out of letters x1, . . . , xn. Letters
x1, . . . , xn are called variables of r. For any rule r, Var(r) := {x1, . . . , xn}. The formula ψ(x1, . . . , xn) is the conclusion of r;
formulas ϕj(x1, . . . , xn) are premises of r.
Definition 4. A rule r is said to be valid in a Kripke structure ⟨F , V ⟩ (we will use notation ⟨F , V ⟩ r, or F V r) if
(F V

1≤i≤m ϕi) ⇒ (F Vψ). Otherwise, we say r is refuted in F , or refuted in F by V , and write F  V r. A rule r
is valid in a frame F (notation F r) if, for all valuations V of Var(r), F V r.
This paper is devoted to study the problem of rules admissible in temporal logic TS4. Historically, introduction into
consideration of admissible inference rules may be referred to [25]. The definition of admissible rules is as follows. LetL be
a logic, FormL be the set of all formulas in the language ofL and r := ϕ1(x1, . . . , xn), . . . , ϕm(x1, . . . , xn) /ψ(x1, . . . , xn) be
an inference rule.
Definition 5. Rule r is admissible for (in)L if, ∀α1 ∈ FormL, . . . , ∀αn ∈ FormL, 
1≤i≤m
(ϕi(α1, . . . , αn) ∈ L)

=⇒ [ψ(α1, . . . , αn) ∈ L].
Thus, r is admissible if, for every substitution s, s(ϕ1) ∈ L, . . . , s(ϕn) ∈ L implies s(ψ) ∈ L. We list below several examples
of admissible rules.
Examples 6. The following holds:
(i) The rule ¬x → y ∨ z/(¬x → y) ∨ (¬x → z) [17] is admissible in the intuitionistic logic IPC but not derivable in the
Heyting axiomatic system for IPC.
(ii) The rule (x → y)→ x ∨ z/((x → y)→ x) ∨ ((x → y)→ z) [28] has the same properties as above.
(iii) The Lemmon–Scott rule
((♦p → p)→ (p ∨ ¬p)) / ♦p ∨ ¬p
is admissible (but non-derivable in standardHilbert-style axiomatic systems) formodal logics S4, S4.1 andGrz (cf. [36]).
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Fig. 1. Example: a frame generated byw.
For a logic L, a formula ϕ is said to be unifiable (in this logic L) if there is a substitution σ (called unifier) such that
σ(ϕ) ∈ L.
To give examples of rules admissible in TS4, notice that any rule ϕ/ψ with non-unifiable premise in TS4 ϕ (i.e. if no σ such
that σ(ϕ) ∈ TS4) will be admissible. For instance, the rule ♦+x ∧ ♦+¬x/y has the premise which cannot be unified in TS4,
and hence is admissible.
Example 7. The rule
r1 := (x → ♦
+y) ∧ (y → ♦−¬x) ∧ (¬x → ♦+y) ∧ (y → ♦−x)
x
has non-unifiable premise, so is admissible, but is invalid, in TS4.
Indeed, there is an TS4-frame which refutes r1 (e.g. the reflexive transitive model ⟨{1, 2, 3}, R, V ⟩, where, 1R2, 3R2, with
the valuation V (x) := {1, 2}, V (y) = {2}, refutes r1). Both the above-mentioned rules have non-unifiable premises in TS4
because for any substitution σ applied to the premises, the result cannot be true in the single-element reflexive frame. 
Remark. Notice that, in the intuitionistic propositional logic IPC, the situation is different if a formula ϕ is not unifiable in
IPC, ϕ is inconsistent (is false in any IPC-model), and the rule ϕ/ψ is valid in any IPC-model (and hance is derivable) for any
formula ψ .
Proposition 8. The rule
r2 := 
+(+♦+x → +y ∨ +z)
+(+♦+x → +y) ∨ +(+♦+x → +z)
is not admissible in TS4 but is admissible in the modal logic S4.
Proof. Indeed, take the substitution: s(x) := x1 ∧ −(♦+¬y ∧ ♦+¬z → ¬+♦+x1), which let y and z intact. Then,
+(+♦+s(x) → +y ∨ +z) ∈ TS4, which may be easily verified by computation of truth values in Kripke models. But,
at the same time, +(+♦+s(x) → +y) ∨ +(+♦+s(x) → +z) ∉ TS4. To show this, take the reflexive and transitive
modelM := ⟨{a, a1, a2, a3}, R, V ⟩, where aRai for all i, V (x1) := {a, a1, a3}, V (y) := {a, a2, a3} and V (z) := {a, a1, a2}. It
is easy to calculate that (M, a)  V (+(+♦+s(x) → +y) ∨ +(+♦+s(x) → +z)). It is well known that the rule r2 is
admissible in S4—for instance, as a derivative of the modal translation of the admissible in the intuitionistic logic Harrop’s
rule mentioned above (cf. for example, [36]). 
So, TS4, despite being defined by the same class of frames as themodal logic S4, does not always admit rules admissible in
S4. The admissibility problem for inference rules inL is to determine, given by the arbitrary inference rule c, if c is admissible
inL. If there is an algorithm solving this problem, we say the admissibility problem is decidable inL.
3. A sufficient condition for admissibility
For any frame F := ⟨F , R⟩ and any w ∈ F , the frame F (w)g generated by w in F is the set of all a ∈ F , were a = w or
wQ1w1, w1Q2w2, . . . , wk−1Qkwk, wk = a for some Qi ∈ {R, R−}, wi ∈ F .
Definition 9. A frame F is said to be generated (or, synonymously, rooted) if F = F (w)g for a worldw ∈ F . The worldw
is said to be its root.
Example of a generated frame is depicted in Fig. 1.
Remark. It is a simple observation that the truth values of temporal formulas with temporal degree m at an world a ∈ F
of a frame F (which has an accessibility relation R) w.r.t. given valuation V depend only on truth values of their letters at
worlds situated in at most 2m distance from aw.r.t. swapping relations R and R−1. Because we often will use this fact in the
following, we formalize and explicitly formulate this property below.
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Fig. 2. A frame with depicted F Z1 (a1) and F
Z
2 (a5).
Let F be a finite frame, a ∈ F and m ∈ N . The set F Zm (a) of all worlds from F situated in F on at most m R-zigzag
distance from a is defined as follows:
F Zm (a) := {b | b ∈ F , ∃b1∃b2 . . . ∃b2m(aRb1R−1b2 . . . b2m−1R−1b2m = b)}.
The structure of the sets F Zm (a) is illustrated at Fig. 2.
For any frame (model) F , we can consider each F Zm as a frame (model) with transferred from F accessibility relation
(and valuation, respectively).
Lemma 10. For any frame F , any a ∈ F , any formula ϕ of temporal degree m, and any valuation V of letters from ϕ in F ,
(F , a) Vϕ⇔ (F Zm , a) Vϕ.
Proof. Follows by standard easy induction onm. 
To study admissible rules, we need a reduction of rules to some equivalent reduced normal forms.







xt(j,i,0)i ∧ (♦+xi)t(j,i,1) ∧ (♦−xi)t(j,i,2)

,
all xs are certain variables (letters), t(j, i, z) ∈ {0, 1} and, for any formula α above, α0 := α, α1 := ¬α. For a rule r, for the
rest of the paper, Var(r) is the set of all variables from r.
Definition 11. Let r be an inference rule and rnf be a rule in the reduced normal form containing all variables of r. rnf is
said to be a normal reduced form for r iff the following hold: (i) r and rnf are equivalent w.r.t. admissibility in any logic, and
(ii) r and rnf are equivalent w.r.t. validity in any frame.
Following closely proofs for Lemma 3.1.3 and Theorem 3.1.11 from [36] (or [31] where we first actually used transfor-
mations of inference rules to normal reduced forms), by similar reasoning, we can derive the following theorem.
Theorem 12. There exists an algorithm running in (single) exponential time, which, for any given inference rule r, constructs a
rule rnf, which is a normal reduced form of r.
Proof. A short draft of the proof follows. In fact, we simply shall specify the general algorithm described in Lemma 3.1.3
and Theorem 3.1.11 [36] to the language of our logic.
Assume that we are given with a rule
r = ϕ1(x1, . . . , xn), . . . , ϕm(x1, . . . , xn)
ψ(x1, . . . , xn)
.
It is evident that r is equivalent to the rule
r0 = ϕ1(x1, . . . , xn) ∧ · · · ∧ ϕm(x1, . . . , xn) ∧ xc ≡ ψ(x1, . . . , xn)xc
where xc is a new variable. Therefore, we can restrict the case to the rules in the form r = ϕ(x1, . . . , xn)/xc .
If ϕ = α ◦ β , where ◦ is a binary logical operation and both formulas α and β are not simply variables or unary logical
operations applied to variables (which both we call final formulas), take two new variables xα and xβ and the rule
r1 := (xα ◦ xβ) ∧ (xα ≡ α) ∧ (xβ ≡ β)/xc .
If one from formulas α or β is final and another one not, we apply this transformation to the non-final formula. It is clear
that r and r1 are equivalent w.r.t. validity in frames.
If ϕ = ∗α, where ∗ is a unary logical operation and α is not a variable, take a new variable xα and the rule
r1 := ∗xα ∧ (xα ≡ α)/xc .
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Again r and r1 are equivalent. We continue this transformation over the resulting rules
j∈J1 γj ∧

i∈I1 xαi ≡ αi
xc
until all formulas αi and γj in the premise of the resulting rules will be either atomic formulas, i.e. logical operations applied
to variables, or variables. Evidently this transformation is polynomial. Further, we transform the premise of the resulting
rule in the disjunctive normal form and make disjunctive normal form to be perfect (having the disjunctive members to be
uniform length and containing all the components required in the definition of reduced normal forms) and obtain as a result
an equivalent rule r2. This transformation, as well as all known ones for reduction of Boolean formulas to disjunctive normal
forms, is exponential in time. As a result the final rule rf has the required form. 
For a logicL, a frame F isL-frame ifL ⊆ L({F }).
Definition 13. A logic L has the linear-compression property if the following holds. For any finite model M := ⟨F , V ⟩
based onL-frame F (i.e.M := ⟨F , V ⟩ is aL-model), where





[xt(j,i,0)i ∧ (♦+xi)t(j,i,1) ∧ (♦−xi)t(j,i,2)]

,
there is a mapping f of |F | onto the base set of a finite modelM1 = ⟨f (|F |), R1, V1⟩with the following properties: for any
disjunct ϕj =1≤i≤k[xt(j,i,0)i ∧ (♦+xi)t(j,i,1) ∧ (♦−xi)t(j,i,2)]) of δ
∀a ∈ F [(F , a) Vϕj ⇔ (f (F ), f (a)) V1ϕj],
and the size of |M1| is linear in δ.
In the following, for any frame F := ⟨F , R⟩ and any a ∈ F , C(a) denotes the cluster of F containing a, i.e., C(a) := {b |
b ∈ F , aRb, bRa}.
Definition 14. We say a logicL has the zigzag-ray property if the following holds. For any finiteL-frame F = ⟨F , R⟩, any
a ∈ F and any finite set {d1, . . . , d2m+3} disjoint with F , the frame ⟨F ∪ {d1, . . . , d2m+3}, R1⟩, where R1 is the transitive close
of the extension of R by xR1d1, for all x ∈ C(a), d2iR1d2i−1, d2iR1d2i+1 and diR1di is also anL-frame.
We will use zigzag ray-property for applications of Lemma 10 in order to get a sufficient condition for admissibility. For
this sufficient condition, we also need the stretching property described below.
For any finite frame F := ⟨F , R⟩ and, for any number k ∈ N , we define frames k-stretched from F as follows. First,
Slmin(F ) is the set of all R-minimal R-clusters from F , and Slmax(F ) is the set of all R-maximal R-clusters. Let St1(F ) :=
⟨F1, R1⟩, where F1 := {w1,1 | w ∈ F}, R1 := {(w1,1, v1,1) | (w, v) ∈ R}:
St2(F ) := ⟨|St1(F )| ∪ St2,1(F ) ∪ St2,2(F ), R2⟩, where
St2,1(F ) := {w2,1 | w ∈ F }, St2,2(F ) := {w2,2 | w ∈ F }, and
R2 := R1 ∪ R2,2, where (w2,i, v2,i) ∈ R2,2⇔(w, v) ∈ R,
(w1,1, v2,1) ∈ R2,2 ⇔ [w ∈ Slmin(F ) ∧ (w, v) ∈ R],
(w2,2, v2,1) ∈ R2,2 ⇔ [v ∈ Slmax(F ) ∧ (w, v) ∈ R].
If Stk(F ) is defined, Stk+1(F ) := ⟨|Stk(F )| ∪ Stk+1,1(F ) ∪ Stk+1,2(F ), Rk+1⟩, where Stk+1,1(F ) := {wk+1,1 | w ∈ F },
Stk+1,2(F ) := {wk+1,2 | w ∈ F }, Rk+1 := Rk ∪ Rk+1,k+1, where (wk+1,i, vk+1,i) ∈ Rk+1,k+1⇔(w, v) ∈ R,
(wk,2, vk+1,1)⇔ [w ∈ Slmin(F ) ∧ (w, v) ∈ R],
(wk+1,2, vk+1,1)⇔ [v ∈ Slmax(F ) ∧ (w, v) ∈ R].
The essence of the stretching procedure is illustrated in Fig. 3.
Definition 15. A logicL is said to have the zigzag stretching property if, for any generated finiteL-frame and any number
m ∈ N , the frame Stm(F ) is again anL-frame.
Recall that, for a frame F , |F | is the base set of F .
Lemma 16. LetL be a temporal logic with (1) fmp, (2) the linear-compression property, (3) the zigzag-ray property and (4) the
zigzag stretching property. If a rule r in the reduced normal form is not admissible in L, then there are finite frames F (b)g and
F1 such that F1 isL-frame, F1 refutes r by a valuation V and
(i) |F1| = |F (b)g | ∪ {d1, . . . , d2m, d2m+1, d2m+2, d2m+3}, where di ∉ F (b)g and the relation R on F1 is the transitive close
of the extension of the relation from F (b)g by xRd1, for all x from the R-cluster C(w), for some single fixed w ∈ F (b)g ,
d2iRd2i−1, d2iRd2i+1 and diRdi;
(ii) m = ‖F (b)g‖ + 4;
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Fig. 3. Stretching procedure.
(iii) ‖F (b)g‖ is linear in size of r;
(iv) the conclusion of r is false by V at b;
(v) ∀i ≥ 2m+1, ValV (di) = ValV (di+1), in particular, the following holds: ∀xj ∈ Var(r)([(F1, di) V♦+xj⇔(F1, di) V xj]&
[(F1, di) V♦−xj⇔(F1, di) V xj]).






[xk(j,i,0)i ∧ (♦+xi)k(j,i,1) ∧ (♦−xi)k(j,i,2)]

,
is inadmissible inL, then there is a substitution σ : Var(r)→ ForL (let, for any xi ∈ Var(r), σ(xi) := αi(p1, . . . , ps)), which
turns the premise of r to a theorem of L, σ(ϕ) ∈ L, but σ(x1) ∉ L. By fmp of L we conclude that there is a finite rooted
L-frame F (b)g and a valuation V of letters p1, . . . , ps in F (b)g where
(F (b)g , b)  Vσ(x1) and ∀c ∈ F (b)g [(F (b)g , c) Vσ(ϕ)]. (1)
In order to use the zigzag-stretching property ofL, we set k := k1+ 3, where k1 is the maximum of temporal degrees of
all formulasαi(p1, . . . , ps). Now, take themodelM based on the frame Stk(F (b)g) (which, by the zigzag-stretching property
ofL, is anL-frame) with the valuation V transferred form F (b)g as follows:
V (pi) := {wj,1 | w ∈ F (b)g , (F (b)g , w) Vpi}
∪ {wj,2 | w ∈ F (b)g , (F (b)g , w) Vpi}
∪ {w1,1 | w ∈ F (b)g , (F (b)g , w) Vpi}.
We need the following auxiliary lemma. All elements of Stk(F (b)g) have the form wδ , where w ∈ F (b)g and δ = (t, 1)
or δ = (t, 2) for some t .
Lemma 17. For any formula θ constructed out of letters p1, . . . , ps from formulas αi(p1, . . . , ps),
∀wδ ∈ Stk(F (b)g)[(Stk(F (b)g), wδ) V θ ⇔ (F (b)g , w) V θ ].
Proof. It is sufficient to note that the mappingwδ → w is the p-morphism w.r.t. the valuation V , and hence this mapping
preserves the truth values of formulas constructed out of letters pi. (Also the statement may be easily shown by standard
induction on the temporal degree of the formula θ .) 
To continue the proof of Lemma 16, by Lemma 17,
(Stk(F (b)g), b1,1)  Vσ(x1). (2)
LetM2k+3 := ⟨{gi | 1 ≤ i ≤ 2k + 3}, Rg , V ⟩, where g2Rgg1, g2Rgg3, and, in general, g2iRgg2i−1, g2iRg2i+1, and gjRgj; let
V (pi) = ∅ for all pi. It is clear that, for all i, for all j, and all j1,
(M2k+3, gj) Vαi(p1, . . . , ps)⇔(M2k+3, gj1) Vαi(p1, . . . , ps). (3)
Take themodelM := ⟨|Stk(F (b)g)|∪|M2k+3|, RM, V ⟩, where RM is the transitive closure of the relation R∪Rg∪{(x, g1) |
x ∈ C(wk,2)}, where wk,2 is a fixed world of Slmin(Stk,2(F (b)g)). By the zigzag-ray property of L, the frame ofM is an L-
frame. By (3) and our choice of k as the maximum of the temporal degrees of the formulas αi(p1, . . . , ps) plus 3, using
Lemma 10 we conclude: for all i, ∀gj with j ≥ k and all j1
(M, gj) Vαi(p1, . . . , ps)⇔(M, gj+j1) Vαi(p1, . . . , ps). (4)
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By (2), (Stk(F (b)g), b1,1)  Vσ(x1) holds, and using that k = k1+ 3, where k1 is greater or equal to the temporal degree
of the formula α1(p1, . . . , ps), by Lemma 10 we derive
(M, b1,1)  Vσ(x1). (5)
Thus, we get thatM refutes the formula σ(x1) by V but, because σ(ϕ) ∈ L andM is based on anL-frame,
M Vσ(ϕ) (6)
holds. Thus, if we take the model ⟨M, V1⟩, where V1(xi) := V (σ (xi)), by (5) and (6) follows
M V1ϕ and (M, b1,1)  V1x1. (7)
Therefore by (7) and (4), the modelM has the following properties:
(M, b1,1)  V1x1; (8)
∀i ≥ k+ 1,∀xj [(M, gi) V1xj⇔(M, gi) V1♦+xj⇔(M, gi) V1♦−xj];
M V1ϕ.
Using the linear-compression property of L we take the mapping f of the model ⟨M, V1⟩ and obtain a model M2 :=
⟨f (|M|), R2, V2⟩ based on anL-frame with size linear in r . By (8),
M2 V2ϕ and (M2, f (b1,1))  V2x1 and for all i ≥ k+ 1 (9)
∀xj [(M2, f (gi)) V2xj⇔(M2, f (gi)) V2♦+xj⇔(M2, f (gi)) V2♦−xj].
Let m = ‖M2‖ + 4. Take the modelM3 := ⟨|M2| ∪ {d1, . . . , d2m+3}, R3, V3⟩, where V3 extends V2 by ∀j, 1 ≤ j ≤ 2m + 3,
ValV3(dj) = ValV2(f (g2k+3)) and R3 is the transitive closure of the extension of R2 by C(f (g2k+3))R3d1, d2iR3d2i−1, d2iR3d2i+1
and diR3di. By the zigzag-ray property of L, we conclude that the modelM3 has all properties required in Lemma 16, and
the proof is complete. 
From Lemma 16, we immediately get the following theorem.
Theorem 18. (A sufficient condition for admissibility) Let a temporal logicL to have (a) fmp, (b) the linear-compression property,
(c) the zigzag-ray property and (d) the zigzag stretching property. If a rule r in the reduced normal form is valid at all finite models
of size linear in r satisfying all properties (i)–(v) from Lemma 16, then r is admissible inL.
Corollary 19. Let a temporal logic L to have (a) fmp, (b) the linear-compression property, (c) the zigzag-ray property and (d)
the zigzag stretching property. If a rule r is valid at all finite models of size exponential in r and satisfying properties (i)–(v) from
Lemma 16 (but, where in (iii) the size is exponential in r), then r is admissible inL.
Proof. Just use previous theorem and Theorem 12 and observe that in transformation of the rule r to its reduced form in
Theorem 12, the size of the obtained rule increases exponentially. 
We will show in the next section that Theorem 18 and this corollary are applicable to TS4. But before, we would like to
comment the situation with algorithm to recognize admissibility in TS4.
Remark. The condition (v) from Lemma 16wasmost important one for a chance to find a necessary and sufficient condition
for admissibility in TS4 and to get based on this condition procedure deciding admissibility. A possible scheme to show that
the conditions from Lemma 16 are necessary for admissibility was to use n-characterizing for TS4 models Mn, n ∈ N . It
would be sufficient, for someMn, to find a valuation for letters of the rule definable in the original valuation fromMn, which
would refute the rule. Actually, in this case, we need, in a sense, to extend the original valuation to inessential, superfluous
worlds. And the condition (v) might allow us to stretch the valuation. But this scheme is not completed yet, and it is an open
question if this can be done. Thus, it is an open question whether the sufficient conditions for admissibility from Lemma 16
are necessary. So, the problem—if the admissibility problem for TS4 is decidable—is open yet.
4. Application to TS4
To apply Theorem 18 and Corollary 19 to TS4 note, first, that TS4 evidently has the zigzag-ray property and the zigzag
stretching property. What we need more is as follows.
Lemma 20. The logic TS4 has the linear-compression property.
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Proof. LetM := ⟨F , V ⟩ be a model based on an TS4-frame F , where






[xt(j,i,0)i ∧ (♦+xi)t(j,i,1) ∧ (♦−xi)t(j,i,2)].
For any ϕj,
P (ϕj) := {xi | t(j, i, 0) = 0}, P (ϕj)+ := {xi | t(j, i, 1) = 0},
P (ϕj)
− := {xi | t(j, i, 2) = 0}.
LetM1 be the model based on the set F1 := {ϕj | ∃a ∈ F , (F , a) ϕj}, with the relation R1, where
ϕj1R1ϕj2 ⇔ [(P (ϕj1)+ ⊇ P (ϕj2)+)&(P (ϕj1)− ⊆ P (ϕj2)−)].
It is easy to see that R1 is reflexive and transitive relation, and that for all ϕj ∈ F1, P (ϕj) ⊆ P (ϕj)+, P (ϕj) ⊆ P (ϕj)−
because F is a reflexive frame. Take the valuation V1 of letters xi in F1 as follows:
V1(xi) := {ϕj | ϕj ∈ F1, xi ∈ P (ϕj)}.
The frame ⟨F1, R1⟩ is an TS4 frame of size linear in δ. Take the mapping f of F in F1, where ∀a ∈ F , f (a) := ϕja , where
a ∈ V (ϕja) (i.e. (F , a) Vϕja ). This mapping is evidently a mapping onto, and by definition of V1,
∀a ∈ F ,∀xi[(F , a) V xi⇔(F1, f (a)) V1xi].
Moreover,
∀a ∈ F ,∀xi[(F , a) V♦+xi⇔(F1, f (a)) V1♦+xi];
∀a ∈ F ,∀xi[(F , a) V♦−xi⇔(F1, f (a)) V1♦−xi].
Indeed, if (F , a) V♦+xi, there is b ∈ F such that aRb and (F , b) V xi. Then (F , a) Vϕja and xi ∈ P (ϕja)+,
(F , b) Vϕjb and xi ∈ P (ϕjb). By definition of R1 we infer ϕjaR1ϕjb , and (F1, ϕjb) V1xi. Hence (F1, ϕja) V1♦+xi.
Vise versa, assume (F1, f (a)) V1♦
+xi. Then, first, (F , a) Vϕja , where f (a) = ϕja . And, ϕjaR1ϕjb , for some ϕjb , where
(F1, ϕjb) V1xi. Then, x1 ∈ P (ϕjb) ⊆ P (ϕjb)+. By ϕjaR1ϕjb we conclude x1 ∈ P (ϕja)+. Therefore, from (F , a) Vϕja
follows (F , a) V♦+xi. The case ♦−xi may be considered similarly. Thus, we proved:
∀a ∈ F ∀ϕj[(F , a) Vϕj ⇔ (f (F ), f (a)) V1ϕj],
which completes the proof of our lemma. 
From this lemma, we conclude that Theorem 18 and Corollary 19 are applicable to TS4 and give sufficient conditions for
admissibility in TS4.
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